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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN A TRANSNATIONAL
WORLD: THE AMBIGUOUS ROLE OF LAW
Peer Zumbansen*

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper originates in part out of diverse legal theoretical enterprises that
have, under the labels of legal realism, reflexive law, and legal pluralism,
contributed to a powerful critique of traditional understandings of law and
have, as such, shaped contemporary legal consciousness. In addition, this
paper takes its cues from the evolving field of transitional justice, which
comprises a diverse set of elements including criminal law, law &
development, the law of occupation and transnational human rights
litigation. At the intersection of these two, domestically and
transnationally spirited sets of legal theoretical inquiries, we find a new
understanding of ‘law in action’. No longer merely the label that points to
the – disillusioning or uplifting – ‘reality’ of law as compared to the ‘law
on the books’, but a far-reaching interpenetration of law and non-law.
Transitional justice can be seen as the sobering moment at which law
reflects on what it can do, what it is, and what it means. As such
transitional justice emerges as a somewhat unexpected site where
conflicting social rationalities test the limits of law in bringing about
order, guaranteeing peace and sustaining integrity. The transnational
evidence of reflections on the place of law in addressing past-injustice on
the one hand and on law’s part in the re-creation of a sustainable social
and political order for the future on the other, is overwhelming. Ranging
*

Canada Research Chair in the Transnational and Comparative Law of Corporate
Governance, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada. Email:
PZumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca. Thanks to Scott Veitch and Emilios Christodoulidis for
helpful comments on this essay and their invitation to the Glasgow Workshop. An earlier
version of this essay, entitled “Transnational Law and Societal Memory” was published
in Veitch ed., Law and the Politics of Reconciliation (2007). This paper is part of a larger
research project on the intersection of law & development and transitional justice. See
Peer Zumbansen / Ruth Buchanan eds., Law in Transition. Rights, Development and
Restorative Justice. An Osgoode Reader (forthcoming, 2009).
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from a fast-growing body of specialized scholarship through Symposia,
Journals on to Dedicated Research Centres, transitional justice has become
a focus area of contemporary legal theory and concern.
What becomes apparent in this context is a distinct field of ‘transnational
transitional justice’, an approach to understanding law, states and societies
in transition that allows for a broader and deeper appreciation of the
different trajectories along which regulatory forms evolve. This
transnational perspective has for some time now begun to powerfully
inform work in various areas of law and other social sciences, including
comparative history. Building on work in post-colonial studies,
comparative historiography, transfer studies and ‘connected’ or ‘shared’
histories, the programs developed under the heading of transnational
history1 and histoire croisée2 are informed by the same deeper-running
transformations that have increasingly been plaguing the law in the
different constellations described above. Globalization and culture are,
across the board, recognized as the two deconstructivist forces that tear
down the edifices of territorially defined political spaces. In law, these
challenges bring about the structural and normative exhaustion of the
welfare state3 with uncertain outcome for any third-way programs or
reconsolidation4, in history they demand the reconsideration of national
histories, of old trajectories now revisited from the perspective of the
1

See Jürgen Osterhammel, Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder
Alternative?, 27 GESCHICHTE UND GESELLSCHAFT (2001); Sebastian Conrad/Jürgen
Osterhammel (Ed.), DAS KAISERREICH TRANSNATIONAL. DEUTSCHLAND IN DER WELT
1871 - 1914, 2004; for critical reflections on this approach, see Hans-Ulrich Wehler,
Transnationale Geschichte - der neue Königsweg historischer Forschung?, in:
GESCHICHTE.
THEMEN,
TENDENZEN,
THEORIEN
161
TRANSNATIONALE
(Budde/Conrad/Janz Ed. 2006).
2

Michael Werner/Bénédicte Zimmermann, Beyond comparison: Histoire croisée and the
challenge of reflexivity, 45 HISTORY AND THEORY 30 (2006)
3

Jürgen Habermas, The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the
Exhaustion of Utopian Energies [1985], in: THE NEW CONSERVATISM. CULTURAL
CRITICISM AND THE HISTORIANS' DEBATE [ed. and transl. by Shierry Weber Nicholsen]
48 (Habermas Ed. 1989)
4

Anthony Giddens/Patrick Diamond/Roger Liddle (Ed.), GLOBAL EUROPE, SOCIAL
EUROPE, 2007; see already the concise analysis by Paul Pierson, The New Politics of the
Welfare State, 48 WORLD POLITICS 143 (1996)
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transnational phenomena that might have shaped them.5 As formulated by
Michael Geyer, “Transnational historiography […] posits the interstices
between nations, the quintessential “in-side,” and the world of crossborder traffic, the quintessential “outside,” as the crucial disjuncture of
modern times and, hence, considers it to be the main source of change. No
nation generates modern life from within, although all of them instantly
historicize and, that is, nationalize modernization (to the ridiculous, but
telling point that all modern inventions are ascribed to indigenous origins).
The long and the short of this is that the development of nations is
predicated on transnational interaction.” To the degree that this approach
does not simply add ‘another’ history to the already existing and studied
ones, it aims, much more ambitiously, to present a different national
history.6
As we try to make sense of changes ‘at home’, these changes attain a
different meaning when seen in relation to larger processes and
transformations that can better be ascertained as transnational in nature.
Asking painful questions then becomes unavoidable: “[…] the bottom line
of an “entangled history” is that “forces and movements” beyond the
control of nations interlace the seemingly autonomous unit of the nation,
define or deny opportunities and options, and create material and cultural
incentives for locals to act. […].”7 As this debate among historians about
the merits of a new approach to studying old histories and the solidity of
the transnational history framework continues to unfold, it suggests that
attempts among other expert groups, lawyers, sociologists, cultural
5

Jürgen Osterhammel/Niels P. Petersson, Globalization: A Short History (2004);
Sebastian Conrad/Jürgen Osterhammel (Ed.), Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland
in der Welt 1871 - 1914, 2004; see also the review by Michael Geyer of the edited
volume,
Transnationale
Geschichte,
supra
note
145,
available
at:
http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/type=revsymp&id=812
6
7

Geyer, loc. cit.

In this context, see for example, Valerie Hébert, The Politics of Punishment: War
Criminals and the Struggle for German Reintegration with the West, 1948-1958, in:
AFTER FASCISM: POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN EUROPE SINCE 1945
(Maria Mesner & Matt Berg eds., 2008), forthcoming; see the excellent account of the
socio-political discursive climate during Adenauer’s reign by NORBERT FREI,
ADENAUER’S GERMANY AND THE NAZI PAST (2002, with Joel Golb, orig. published in
German 1996)
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theorists, exploring the intersections between law & development,
restorative justice, and the rule of law can, if at all, bear productive
insights only when and where we accept this overlapping of conceptual
and disciplinary perspectives as a starting point.
The following observations are made in this light. They pertain to the
complexity of an emerging conceptual framework that for the time being
sits strangely within a legal order built on distinctions between the national
and the international. Transitional justice, against this background, can be
taken as an invitation to reflect on the dynamic tensions that both uphold
and constantly question such demarcation lines.

II. NEW BEGINNINGS
The “big bang” of military or political revolution that accompanies the
setting free of powerful dynamics of transition and transformation, of postconflict, post-apartheid and post-war justice, has triggered a widespread
and wide-ranging research agenda around the world that is concerned with
the chances of a new “beginning” and the need to adequately account for
legacies and past experiences in the process.8 From post-apartheid South
Africa9, the East- and West-German narratives of the Nazi past10 and
Germany’s Reunification11, on to post-genocide Rwanda12 and the
8

Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2000); Teitel,
“The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice”, (2005) 38 Cornell Int'l L.
Rev. 837-862; see the contributions in Christodoulidis/Veitch eds., Lethe’s Law: Law and
Ethics in Reconciliation (Oxford, UK/Portland, OR; Hart Publishing, 2001).
9

Gross, "Reconciliation in South Africa" (2004) 40 Stanf. J. Int'l L. 40-107.

10

Herbert/Goehler, Zweierlei Bewältigung. Vier Beiträge über den Umgang mit der
nationalsozialistischen Vergangenheit in den beiden deutschen Staaten (Hamburg,
Edition, 1992).

11

See only Markovits, "Selective Memory: How the Law Affects What We Remember and
Forget from the Past: The Case of East Germany" (2001) 35 Law and Society Review
513-563
12

Mgbako, "Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in
Post-Genocide Rwanda" (2005) 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal 201-224; Agbakwa,
"Genocidal Politics and Racialization of Intervention: From Rwanda to Darfur and
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‘transformative occupation’13 of Iraq14, the existing accounts of this
process challenge our understanding of how to go about the future while
minding the past. In a crucial way, such fragile and vulnerable societal
projects challenge the role of law as we learn to recognize its distinct role
in ascertaining past deeds committed, plights suffered and answers found
to the often unspeakable events of the past. Importantly, coupled with this
reconstructive, dialogical dimension of the law’s addressing of the (its)
past, we find its institutional dimension.15 While the former encompasses
accountability, reconstruction and ‘truth’, the latter relates to the recreation or foundation of democratic institutions, constitutions and the rule
of law.16 But it is this tension between the allegedly extraordinary status of
the events on the one hand, and the regular and reliable workings of the
legal order on the other that informs and structures our approach to
bringing the law to bear upon these challenges. Is law quiet in states of
exceptions17, during les heures zero, and at notorious, ‘new beginnings’
Beyond"
(2005)
6
German
Law
Journal
513-531,
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol06No02/PDF_Vol_06_No_02_513531_Developments_Agbakwa.pdf.

at

13

Bhuta, "The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation" (2005) 16 European Journal of
International Law [EJIL] 721-740

14

Anderson, The Fall of Bhagdad (2004); Nuri Frame, “One Step Forward, Two Steps
Back? The Failings of the Iraqi Special Tribunal”, Paper written for the GLOBALIZATION
AND THE LAW Course at Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, April 2005 (on file with
author).
15

Chesterman, You, The People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and
State-Building (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2004), at 154: “One of the
most important and difficult challenges confronting a post-conflict society is the reestablishment of faith in the institutions of the state. Respect for the rule of law in
particular, implying subjugation to consistent and transparent principles under state
institutions exercising a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, may face special
obstacles.”

16

For an excellent overview of the panoply, see Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford/New
York, Oxford University Press, 2000); see also Chesterman, You, The People. The United
Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford/New York, Oxford
University Press, 2004).

17

This goes back to Cicero’s oratio pro annio milone, where he states: inter arma silent
leges. This has found a great renaissance in the wide-spread curtailment of civil rights in
the international and domestic war on terror. Hereto, e.g., Morgan, "Slaughterhouse Six:
Updating the Law of War" (2004) 5 German Law Journal 525-544; Scheppele, "Law in a
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that suggest their apartness from the otherwise silent or violent workings
of the law?18 New beginnings offer themselves as chances of coinciding
legality and legitimacy, but the law of new beginnings is in fact tainted
and burdened by the past experiences of law that question the acceptable
meaning and substance of the term itself.19 “What is deemed just is
contingent and informed by prior injustice.”20
This paper wishes to bring to contemporary discussions of post-conflict
justice and nation-building a uniquely focused perspective. Its basis lies in
an understanding of the challenges faced by law in different post-conflict
contexts where law is expected to provide the grounding and starting point
for national and societal reconstruction. While the distinct experiences that
we can observe are deeply embedded in particular histories and
trajectories of countries and peoples, the law’s response has, at least since
the Nuremberg trials, taken on a wider perspective. Far from suggesting a
one-size-fits-all answer to the legal void after periods of atrocities and
human suffering, we can observe the emergence of a transnational law of
post-conflict justice. It develops from the increasingly shared experiences
in designing a legal answer in situations of post-conflict reconstruction.
These situations illustrate the utmost challenge of legally addressing the
downfall of law, of reliability, and legitimacy. Whether law can at all
adequately address the absence of (a higher sense of) law ex post, remains
Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11" (2004) 6 University
of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 1001-1083; Oliver Lepsius, “The
Relationship Between Security and Civil Liberties in the Federal Republic of Germany
after September 11”, in Paul Gewirtz/Jacob Katz Cogan (eds.), Global Constitutionalism:
Privacy, Proportionality, Terrorism and Civil Liberties (New Haven, Yale University
Press, 2002), III 7. For its legacies, see only Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters
on the concept of sovereignty [1922] (transl. George Schwab) (Cambridge, MA, The
MIT Press, 1986); Koskenniemi, "'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much'. Kosovo, and the
Turn to Ethics in International Law" (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 159-175.
18

Hay, "Time, Inequality, and Law's Violence", in Sarat/Kearns (ed) Law's Violence (Ann
Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1992), 141-173.

19

Gustav Radbruch, “Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht”, in (1946)
Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung 105; see hereto the debate between Hart, "Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals" (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593-628, and Fuller, "Fidelity to
Law - A Reply to Professor Hart" (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630-672.

20

Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2000), 6.
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a fundamental conundrum no different from the question of how to
adequately speak of the unspeakable.21 Worldwide experiences with
village courts, truth commissions and international and domestic criminal
tribunals testify to a border transcending inquiry into the intricacies of
transitional justice. Such experiences are being portrayed, researched,
communicated and compared, and they inform contemporary and future
efforts. The boundaries between legal process and alternative or
complementing forms of societal reconciliation have been shown to
become increasingly porous in light of the overwhelming challenge to
those engaged in transformative politics. It is against this background that
the distinctive role of law warrants closer inspection.
The following section of this paper will introduce the notion of
transnational law [TL]. The subsequent parts will mobilize the concept and
idea of transnational law to further explore the particular qualities of law’s
capacity to address past injustice. The transnational perspective
illuminates the impasses and blind spots that straight-forward legal
approaches to righting past wrongs have in common. While a growing
number of examples litigating for the compensation of historic crimes
have become available over the past years22, truth commissions in postapartheid South-Africa or the Gacaca Courts in post-genocide Rwanda
have been taken as powerful examples for alternative, or not exclusively
law-based, routes to societal reconciliation. The development of
21

See, for example, Hunt, This Was Not Our War. Bosnian Women Reclaiming the Peace
(Durham & London, Duke University Press, 2004); Uwe Timm, Am Beispiel meines
Bruders (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2003), 91: “Die formelhafte Zusammenfassung der Eltern
für das Geschehen war der Schicksalsschlag, ein Schicksal, worauf man persönlich
keinen Einfluss hatte nehmen können. Den Jungen verloren und das Heim, das war einer
der Sätze, mit denen man sich dem Nachdenken über die Gründe entzog. Man glaubte mit
diesem Leid seinen Teil an der allgemeinen Sühne geleistet zu haben. Fürchterlich war
eben alles, schon weil man selbst Opfer geworden war, Opfer eines unerklärlichen
kollektiven Schicksals. Es waren dämonische Kräfte, die entweder außerhalb der
Geschichte walteten ode Teil der menschlichen Natur waren, auf jeden Fall waren sie
katastrophisch und unabwendbar. Entscheidungen, in die man sich nur schicken konnte.
Und man fühlte sich vom Schicksal ungerecht behandelt.”
22

Baumgartner, "Human Rights and Civil Litigation in United States Courts: The
Holocaust-Era Cases" (2002) 80 Wash. U. L. Quarterly 835-854; Sarkin, "Reparation for
Past Wrongs: Using Domestic Courts Around the World, Especially the United States, to
Pursue Human Rights Claims" (2004) 32 Int. J. of Legal Information 426-460.
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alternatives proved to mature fast, and contemporary assessments reveal
an increasingly refined focus of inquiry into the structure of mass crimes.23
This refinement brings into play again the intricate relationship between
legal process and other societal communications in post-conflict situations.
The transnational law of post-conflict justice, then, unfolds less as a firmly
established or contained body of law, but as an approach to structuring,
with the help of legal norms and legal theory, processes of establishing
accountability and legal responsibility. While contemporary acts of public
remembrance might be accompanied with solemn declarations of
‘historical’, ‘moral’, or ‘political’ responsibility24, legal responsibility
seems much harder to attain. The definitive nature of legal responsibility
seems to stand in stark contrast to the truth-finding efforts that are
illustrated by the examples of South-Africa or Rwanda. With victims or
their heirs ardently seeking their ‘day in court’, often many decades after
the deed25, we are confronted with the challenge of designing the legal
process in a manner that makes the practice of the law as it was known
then visible and comprehensive while opening all possible ways of
reconciliation today. The obstacles we face in the struggle for truth, for a
better understanding and, ultimately, for forgiveness and forgetting26 must
seem insurmountable in light of the arbitrary ways by which the rulers are
separated from the ruled, the oppressors from the oppressed.27 “Because
why should one assume that the end result of our accounting of the past

23

See, for example, Eltringham, Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in
Rwanda (London, Pluto Press, 2004).

24

See, for example, the preamble to the Law establishing the compensation fund
“Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future”, available at http://www.compensationfor-forced-labour.org/pdf/Foundation_law_consolidated_E.pdf
25

See hereto, for example, Neuborne, "Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of HolocaustEra Litigation in American Courts" (2002) 80 Washington University Law Quarterly
795-834.

26

See on the eminent role of forgetting, Margalit, The Ethics of Memory (Cambridge,
MA/London, UK, Harvard University Press, 2002), Chapter 6: “Forgiving and
Forgetting”.

27

See hereto also the intriguing novel by Vladimir Nabokov, Bend Sinister (1947),
republished by Vintage, 1990. I am indebted to my friend, Achim Podak, who guided me
to this book.
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will move us any closer to a shared community rather than a break-down
of community?”28
It is here, however, where the eminent role of the law shines through, both
with regard to its contribution to the preceding, unjust legal state as well as
to its current role in shaping the communicative processes that unfold
between the perpetrators and the victims during transition.29 In these
highly contested moments of human conflict, the role of the law is itself
questionable. Against this challenge, it shall be argued that the law plays a
pivotal role in the process of societal post-conflict resolution. It does so by
providing for rules and for language that contain and capture otherwise
dispersed understandings and value assessments as they once were
expressed through a norm, a ruling or legal terminology. While law can
only observe the dichotomy between legal and illegal30, this reductionism
is in fact able to capture the tensions that mark conflict communication in
highly heterarchical societies. Post-conflict societies are of a dramatically
fragile nature, and law assumes an organizing, reminding and guiding role
in providing part of the communication structure of that society. As law is
being put to an existential test in post-conflict situations, the very nature of
law becomes questionable. It is in this light, then, that the inquiry into the
law of post-conflict justice links ongoing searches of the role of law in
society in different, yet comparable contexts. It is here where the idea of
transnational law begins to unfold.

28

Christodoulidis, "Law's Immemorial", in Christodoulidis/Veitch (ed) Lethe's Law.
Justice, Law and Ethics in Reconciliation (Oxford, UK/Portland, OR, Hart Publishing,
2001), 207-227, at 221.

29

See the novel by Achmat Dangor, Bitter Fruit (New York, Grove Atlantic, 2004), for a
forceful illustration of the destructive impact of apartheid rule and human failings on
humans even long after the fall of the oppressor regime.

30

Luhmann, Law as a Social System (K.Ziegert transl., F.Kastner, D.Schiff, R.Nobles,
R.Ziegert eds.) (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2004).
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III. THE MEANING OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
The first usage of the term transnational law [TL] continues to be disputed.
While scholarship focused on the origins of the term for a long time, it has
since become apparent that the real challenge of TL lies in its scope and
conceptual aspiration.31 Within an interdisciplinary research agenda
concerning the transformation of globalized law, TL offers itself as a
supplementing and challenging category. Famously conceptualized in a
series of lectures by Philip Jessup at Yale Law School in 195632, TL
‘breaks the frames’ (Teubner) of traditional thinking about interstate
relationships by pointing to the myriad forms of border-crossing relations
among state and non-state actors.
Jessup writes that he “shall use the term ‘transnational law’ to include all
law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers.
Both public and private international law are included, as are other rules
which do not wholly fit into such standard categories” (Jessup 1956: 2).
When examining the inescapable ‘problem’ of people worldwide whose
lives are ‘affected by rules’, Jessup points to the striking contingency by
“which we attribute the label of ‘law’ to rules, norms or customs that
govern various situations. It is the hallmark of TL to identify the hidden
agendas and the blind spots of traditional regulatory law understandings.
These are marked by clear assignments of law making authority to certain
institutions on the one hand and a clear view of which norms of societal
guidance are to be recognized as legal rules. In contrast, TL suggests a
widening of the law making agenda and of our understanding of law as
such. TL emerges from the increasingly interlocking spheres of societal
norm production by public, official and private, in-official norm-setting
agencies and actors.

31

Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956); Koh,
"Transnational Legal Process" (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181-206.

32

Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956).
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Based on such an expanded understanding of law, TL has begun to reach
deep into the heart of contemporary struggles over the role of law within
dispersed and fragmented spaces and places of norm-production.33 TL
reminds us of the very fragility and unattainedness of law. At the
beginning of the 21st Century, we are still at a loss to identify a theory of
law that would be subtle enough not to stifle emerging identities in a postcolonial era34 while providing forms, fora and processes35 for the collision
of discourses that mark post-metaphysical, legal thinking.36 TL is
characterized by the emergence of norms that are no longer only generated
by officially recognized sources of the law, but by a multitude of
domestic, foreign and transnational norm-producers. This soft law
constitutes a radical challenge to the state-based concept of law making
that began to emerge in the 19th Century and that Max Weber, among
others37, so powerfully captured as the rise of ‘modern law’.38 In contrast
to law originating in an official constitutional order, soft law encompasses
norms that are not attributable to an official author of statutory norms, and
which do not appear directly enforceable by recognized, traditional means
for the execution and application of legal rules. Instead, the soft law that is
now emerging in many fields of regulatory law39 can be read as reactions
33

For the background of the distinction between spaces and places, see Sassen,
Globalization and Its Discontents. Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money
(New York, The New Press, 1998).

34

See, for example, Lyon, "Discourse in Development: A Post-Colonial Theory 'Agenda'
for the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (2003) 10 Journal of
Gender, Social Policy & the Law http://ssrn.com/abstract=449301.

35

Wiethölter, "Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law", in Teubner (ed)
Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (Berlin/New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 221249.

36

Habermas, "Paradigms of Law" (1996) 17 Cardozo Law Review 771-784; Habermas,
Between Facts and Norms [transl. William Rehg] (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1996).

37

Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law [1936] (transl. Walter Moll,
introd. Roscoe Pound) (New York, Russell & Russell Inc., 1962).

38

Max Weber, Economy and Society: Part 2: Sociology of Law (1914), § 8: The formal
qualities of modern law.

39

See, e.g., Linda Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law, (Oxford, UK/Portland,
OR, Hart Publishing, 2004); Blanpain/Colucci, The Globalization of Labour Standards.
The Soft Law Track (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2004); Kirton/Trebilcock
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against incapacities on the side of the state to proceed with adequate
legislation. The proliferation of soft law thus offers examples of what
anthropologists and legal sociologists have for a long time been describing
as ‘legal pluralism’.40 It consists of expert standards, best practices,
recommendations as well as principles and standards that can be seen as
fertilizing ongoing searches for ‘better law’ without due regard to political
or geographical borders.
The relevance of TL to an understanding of contemporary regulatory
challenges, however, is not restricted to the field of law as such. With
regard to law, TL works itself like a drill through the few remaining
security blankets hastily thrown over an impoverished and internally
decaying conceptual body. But, beyond the study and practice of law, TL
can serve to illuminate current searches in regulatory theory and societal
self-regulation.

IV. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE
In the context of and in concert with other complementing disciplines, TL
is distinctly able to fertilize other conceptual searches while being
(Ed.), Hard Choices, Soft Law. Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and
Social Governance (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004); Trubek/Trubek, "Hard and Soft Law in
the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Coordination" (2005)
11 European Law Journal 343-364; Zumbansen, "The Parallel Worlds of Corporate
Governance and Labor Law" (2005) 13 Indiana Journal of Global Studies forthcoming.
40

Moore, "Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate subject
of study" (1973) 7 Law and Society Review 719-746; Griffiths, "What is Legal
Pluralism?" (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1-55; Arthurs,
Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century
England (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1988), 50-88 (describing the persistence
of legal pluralism in light of the ever stronger tendencies to centralize law through
statutory law and official courts). For further assessments of legal pluralism, see Teubner,
"'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society", in Teubner (ed) Global Law
Without A State (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1997), 3-28, and Perez, "Normative Creativity
and Global Legal Pluralism: Reflections on the Democratic Critique of Transnational
Law" (2003) 10 Indiana Journal of Global Studies 25-64.
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informed by the transformations occurring within these disciplines. As
much as TL has been shown to lay bare the raw and vulnerable
foundations of law in all of its absurd contingency41 and utopian
aspiration, while being based in social practice administered with
denominational authority42, law itself reaches out to disciplines such as
history, cultural studies and anthropology to tell its own story. With legal
history taking form as a transnational enterprise43, it can build on and learn
from the work being done by historians and cultural studies scholars. The
emergence of transnational history gives overwhelming testimony of a
border-crossing inquiry into the legality-legitimacy narratives of state and
nation building. Formerly conceived and framed in discrete fashions,
domestic/national historical narratives reveal and communicate common
experiences and semantic appropriations in comparative, transnational and
global perspective.44
The Law of post-conflict justice shifts between the unattainable poles of
retribution and reconciliation, between persecution and justice, between

41

See the discussion of law in Jean Anouilh, Antigone (London, UK, Methuen, 2000),
transl. by Barbara Trans, edited by Ted Freeman.

42

Moore, "Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate subject
of study" (1973) 7 Law and Society Review 719-746; Bourdieu, "The Force of Law:
Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field" (1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 805-813;
Derrida, "Force of law" (1990) 11 Cardozo Law Review 919-1045; hereto see also the
Special Issue of German Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1 January 2005), available at:
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues_archive.php.
43

Merry, "Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes" (1992) 21 Annual Review
of Anthropology 357-379; Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of
International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005); see the contributions
to
Geschichte-transnational,
http://geschichte-transnational.clioonline.net/transnat.asp?lang=en .

44

Bright/Geyer, "World History in a Global Age" (1995) 100 American Historical
Review 1034-1060; Bentley, "Cross-Cultural Interaction and Periodization in World
History" (1996) 101 American Historical Review 749-770; Middell, "Kulturtransfer und
Historische Komparatistik - Thesen zu ihrem Verhältnis" (2000) 10 Comparativ 7-41;
Conrad/Osterhammel (Ed.), Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt
1871 - 1914 (Göttingen, 2004); Geschichte-transnational, http://geschichtetransnational.clio-online.net/transnat.asp?lang=en
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remembrance and forgetfulness.45 It is destined and cursed to do so while
its very foundations are exposed in its inadequacy at every turn. “Law is
caught between the past and the future, between backward-looking and
forward-looking, between retrospective and prospective, between the
individual and the collective.”46 Experiences with alternative routes to
societal reconciliation in past years have shown how very fragile and in
many ways ill-suited the legal apparatus is in the context of post-conflict
reconstruction. This moment shows the co-existing poles of law, its
utopia, reconciliation and forgiving on the one hand and revolution and
retribution on the other. Law and the functions it serves do not exist
outside of human imagination, but law is not merely the result of human
action. Instead, it is through its function that we can begin to understand
the unique quality of law. As developed by the German sociologist and
legal theorist, Niklas Luhmann, law serves primarily to stabilize
expectations. It does so by producing rules that preserve the identification
of something as “legal” over time and therefore are available for an
assessment at a later point in time. The time-binding quality of law is thus
the basis and the core of Luhmann’s legal theory. By “moving the problem
to the temporal dimension [w]e can see the social meaning of law in the
fact that there are social consequences if expectations can be secured as
stable expectations over time.”47
The law of post-conflict justice can be observed to provide exactly that. It
serves to establish a framework for the stabilization of societal
expectations. Just which law is most adequate to guide this process
remains a great challenge. The very connectedness of the assessment of
past injustice with the normative architecture of a new legal order makes it
evident that often, in the application of post-conflict justice, it is not
merely a specific statute or practice on trial, but a whole system. Taking
45

Adler/Zumbansen, "The Forgetfulness of Noblesse: A Critique of the German
Foundation Law Compensating Slave and Forced Laborers of the Third Reich" (2002) 39
Harvard Journal on Legislation [and in: Zwangsarbeit im Dritten Reich: Erinnerung und
Verantwortung / NS Forced Labor: Remembrance and Responsibility 333 (P. Zumbansen
ed. 2002)] 1-61.

46
47

Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2000), 6.

Luhmann, Law as a Social System (K.Ziegert transl., F.Kastner, D.Schiff, R.Nobles,
R.Ziegert eds.) (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2004), 143.
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this into consideration, the realm of questions to be addressed is far greater
than any piece-meal approach to remedying a wrong would ever entail.48
Recent inquiries into the specific role of constitution-making and of
constitutional law in the transitional process have begun to shed some light
on the intricate dynamics of legal norms in post-conflict and other
transitional contexts.49 But, while the creation of constitutional bodies
bears the insigna of a fresh start, of new beginnings50, the big bang and
bright lights of constitution making are only too likely to render us deaf
and blind to the constant struggle for law’s dominion in the every day
workings of established legal orders.51 The particular attention received by
constitutional processes in periods of transition leads to an isolation of
constitutional law and constitution making from the legal order in general.
By that, the legal order becomes reified as something that functions
smoothly and is in no further need of critical assessment. The exposition
of constitutional moments in transition periods functions to cast a shadow
on the persisting legitimacy challenges that are inherent to the legal order
as such.52 Constitutional beginnings, then, share a decisive characteristic
48

See hereto Thomas W. Pogge, Historical Wrongs. The Two Other Domains, in Lukas
Meyer ed., Justice in Time. Responding to Historical Injustice (Baden-Baden, Nomos,
2004), 117-134, highlighting the way in which “past injustice […] can affect present
moral reasons for action.” (117)

49

See Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism, and South-Africa's Political
Reconstruction (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2000); Walker, "The Idea
of Constitutional Pluralism" (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317-359; see in this context
the intriguing, comparative analysis by Gross, "Reconciliation in South Africa" (2004) 40
Stanf. J. Int'l L. 40-107 for South-Africa and Israel and Mattias Kumm, “The Idea of
Constitutional Patriotism and its Implications for the Role and Structure of European
Legal History”, (2005) 6 German Law Journal 319.
50

See the careful assessment by Dupré, Importing the Law in Post-communist
Transitions, The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Right to Human Dignity
(Oxford, UK/Portland, OR, Hart Publishing, 2003), hereto also Renata Uitz, in (2005)
Annual of German & European Law Vol. 2 (Miller & Zumbansen eds., Oxford/New
York, Berghahn Books, 2005), forthcoming.

51
52

Gross, “Reconciliation in South Africa”, at 51.

See only Koskenniemi, "'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much'. Kosovo, and the Turn to
Ethics in International Law" (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 159-175; Orford, “Muscular
Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of Humanitarian Intervention”, (1999) 10
European Journal of International Law [EJIL] 679-711, at 689-692.
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with other narratives of new (legal) orders which we often find presented
as creating a forum and framework for an untainted legitimacy of societal
order through law.53 Eventually, the pomp and glory of constitutional talk
dissociates the fragile and constantly endangered emergence of a legal
order from a long-standing critique of law. It is against this background,
that we ought to reflect on the role that law can play in transition periods:
not isolated and put on a podium of the world’s fleeting attention and
excitement, but embedded in a continuing critique of the force and
weakness of legal norms.

V. REMEMBRANCE AND UTOPIA IN LAW
The reformation and its ensuing energies as well as the subsequent
bourgeois revolutions of early modernity are characterized by the
emergence of the individual subject as the centre of social and political
activity. Henceforth,it has been against the individual that order and its
legitimacy claims are measured. To the degree in which they are found to
be foul and rotten, they are doomed and will be swept away: with the
dawn of modernity, man begins to order his world in time. Human history
in search of direction, in the meantime unfolding possibilities of
probability and prudence.54 (I’m not sure I understand this sentence)
Religious prophecy is replaced by supposedly rationalist forecast, but this
forecast radiates a sense of stability similar to that which before emanated
from eschatologic trust in providence or the felt threat of demise. In the
interaction between the state and individual, now both matured, the
knoweldge of the changeability of things is foundational in the state’s
creation of its own legitmacy grounds. Time’s horizon is no longer as open
53

For a critique, see Zumbansen, "Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and
Transnational Law" (2002a) 8 European Law Journal 400-432; Zumbansen, "Sustaining
Paradox Boundaries: Perspectives on the Internal Affairs in Domestic and International
Law" (2004a) 15 European Journal of International Law [EJIL] 197-211.

54

Koselleck, "Vergangene Zukunft der frühen Neuzeit (1968)" (1979) ders., Vergangene
Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten (zuerst erschienen in Epirrhosis. Festgabe
für Carl Schmitt, hrsg. v. Barion, Böckenförde, Forsthoff, Weber, Bd. 2, 549-566 17-37;
Koselleck, "Begriffsgeschichte und Sozialgeschichte (1972)" (1979) in: id., Vergangene
Zukunft (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1979) 107-129.
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as it used to be. Adopting the role of interpretor and direction-setter the
state defines progression into a now unknown and final, but also
manageable future.This rupture, however, is not yet absolute. Eschatology
remains strong in the background and the consciousness of one’s time
future is a strange but courageous mix of politics and prophecy.55 Within
this rationalist philosophy of progress we can see rationalist future
prognostics unfolding. These are in turn still dominated by an important
incorporation of the past into the imagery of the future. The events that are
expected within the political horizon of historical development are seen as
reoccurring and reappearing events, repeating themselves instead of being
grand beginnings or last ends. From this perspective, the future that is
actually envisioned for the state is simultaneously present in the past, the
realm of political action contemporaneously occupied as well as
confined.56 Time is important, because with ever more rapid sequences of
events, brought about by deliberate human action and understood as such,
the “realms of experience” (Erfahrungsräume) shrink, and the experience
of the present falls victim to this unforeseeability in a way that makes the
present’s experience of time evade into the future.57 Presence can no
longer experience itself as presence but is now forced to resort to its own
historio-philosophical
assumption
(selbstbezogene
geschichtsphilosophische Einholung). Parallelly, the semantics used to
describe these both opened and closed spheres of possibilities are
changing as well: Utopia can no longer characterize the experience
horizon of political thinking, only Revolution.58 Yet, it is felt that
revolution may put an absolute end to everything. In this respect
revolution is always confronted with reaction59 and, in turn, every future
oriented action is of a political nature. While utopia and revolution are
hence distinguishable by the absence (utopia) and presence (revolution) of
55

Koselleck, 33.

56

Ibid.

57

Koselleck, "'Erfahrungsraum' und 'Erfahrungshorizont' - zwei historische Kategorien
(1975)" (1979) in: id., Vergangene Zukunft (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt) 349-375

58

Niklas Luhmann, Die Politik der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2000), 208: „Die
Befürworter lernen, daß Revolution ein langfristiger Prozeß ist, die Gegner sehen
Revolution als Folge falscher Ideen.“

59

Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft, 34-5
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deliberate human action and by the belief that change can be brought
about by abruptly ending traditional ways, usually under the signum of
eventual responsibility, legal practicioners of post-conflict justice are
operating somewhere in between the horizons of utopia and revolution.

VI. THE CHANGING FACE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE LAW OF OCCUPATION
The transnational perspective can further illuminate the challenge to law
and societal memory that we find in various post-conflict situations around
the world. These situations can be seen as entering the legal imagination
against the background of a dramatically enlarged and yet fragmented and
incoherent human rights agenda. While the scandalization of human rights
violations drives legal efforts to address wrongdoings beyond
jurisdictional boundaries60, we still seem far away from a comprehensive
human rights regime. However, such a legal order might not even be
desired in light of the different claims connected to the expansion of
human rights. And yet, it is from this ongoing search for a better law, that
the transnational law of post-conflict justice takes its cue. It develops in
the light of a greater global awareness of the need for a human rights
agenda and enters existing legal fields that are themselves undergoing
dramatic changes.61 Because it is dramitically intertwined with ongoing
legal reforms in post-conflict situations, the law of occupation vividly

60

Scott, "Translating Torture into Transnational Tort: Conceptual Divides in the Debate
on Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Harms", in Scott (ed) Torture as Tort
(Portland, OR/Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001), 45-63; Scott/Wai, "Transnational
Governance of Corporate Conduct through the Migration of Human Rights Norms: The
Potential of Transnational "Private" Litigation", in Joerges/Sand/Teubner (ed)
Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Oxford/Portland, OR, Hart Publishing,
2004), 287-319; Zumbansen, "Beyond Territoriality: The Case of Transnational Human
Rights
Litigation",
in:
ConWEB
Paper
4/2005,
available
at:
http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesandPhilosophy/Resear
ch/PaperSeries/ConWEBPapers/.
61

Bhuta, "The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation" (2005) 16 European Journal of
International Law [EJIL] 721-740.
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reflects the changed legal agenda.Its recent past points to a much more
encompassing agenda of reconstruction and nation-building.62
The future orientated perspective of the law of occupation has transformed
this body of law from one applicable to post-military situations of
desirably brief occupation and focussed on peace and sanitary stability to
an encompassing legal agenda aiming at administrative reconstruction and
state-building. This transformation is nowhere more visible than in the
current situation in Iraq. The present state of the law of occupation in Iraq
finds a distinctive expression in the United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1483, 1546 and in the letter by the US’ and the UK’s
permanent representative Security Council of 8 May 2003.63 In this letter,
both leaders were explicitly outspoken with regard to the reconstructive
efforts that the occupiers ought to undertake64, and it is this mandate that
the Security Council Resolution adopted almost verbatim in UNSC
Resolution 1483.
The transformation of the international law of occupation is closely linked
to changes in public international law at large. While this in itself seems
obvious, the actual impact is far less so.65 Few observers of the
international legal scene today would be willing to testify to its simple
state of development. Instead, international law ranges among the most
contested of legal areas at this time. Its present situation, characterized by
62

See for example the remarkable, new introduction to Eyal Benvenisti, The
International Law of Occupation (Oxford, UK/Princeton, NY, Princeton University
Press, 2004).
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S/2003/538, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document
/2003/0608usukletter.htm
64

Id.: “The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners are facilitating the
establishment of representative institutions of government, and providing for the
responsible administration of the Iraqi financial sector, for humanitarian relief, for
economic reconstruction, for the transparent operation and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure
and natural resources, and for the progressive transfer of administrative responsibilities to
such representative institutions of government, as appropriate. Our goal is to transfer
responsibility for administration to representative Iraqi authorities as early as possible.”
65

See Ian Williams, “Will International Law Shape Occupation, or the Occupation Shape
International Law?”, (2003) Global Policy Forum 14 May 2003, available at:
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/law/2003/0514shape.htm
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a self-understanding still seeking the beginnings of its current disarray66,
offers much testimony of the seemingly eternal juxtaposition of
international law and politics, of universalism and hegemony. But, at the
same time, international law has become so much more reflexive, that its
period of untiring self-questioning and self-reassuring can now safely be
declared to be past. Instead, international law’s contemporary soulsearching calls for for an extended exploration of the discipline’s young,
but troubled history with its increased meeting-points and soulmateships
with inquiries such as cultural studies, international regime studies, legal
theory and transnational law, literary theory and transnational history.67 At
present, however, the noises of the “real”68 are louder than the suggestions
of the “social”.69 Current assessments of international law still struggle
with old demons of inferiority and irrelevance in the ugly face of
international politics, imperialism and hegemony, but they also reach out
to encompass the particular nature of international law.70 The latter we can
only begin to understand when reflecting on the very nature of the
international order on the one hand, and of our understanding of law and
legal regulation on the other. Our assessment of the role of law in the
dynamic and contested international order depends on our understanding
of this order, but there is no simple causal relationship between the social
reality and the legal order. Instead, our inquiries into the structure of the
66

See Michael Byers, Introduction: The complexities of foundational change, in
Byers/Nolte (Ed.), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-22.
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Koskenniemi, "International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal" (2005)
16 European Journal of International Law [EJIL] 113-124; for further references, see
Zumbansen, "Transnational Law", in Smits (ed) Encyclopedia of Comparative Law
Edward Elgar, 2006), forthcoming.
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Zižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related
Dates (New York, Verso, 2002).
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Kennedy, "Two Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-1968" (2003) 36
Suffolk L. Rev. 631-679; Kerry Rittich,“The Future of Law and Development: Second
Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social”, (2004) 26 Michigan Journal of
International Law 199-243.
70
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the International Legal Order" (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law [EJIL]
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international order proceed in relative autonomy from the progress made
in legal theory with regard to developing an international law for the
global age.71 Where our understanding of law passess from first
assessments of violence (Bodin, Hobbes) on to formalization (Kelsen) to
realism (Llewellyn) or to downfall (Schmitt), to reassment (Kelsen, Hart,
Fuller, Dworkin) on to fragmentation and dispersement (Teubner, Sousa
Santos), the legal theory of international law has undergone dramatic
changes, while international law itself has assumed a contested form that
today differs much from earlier challenges of its weakness. At present,
International Law must remember and assess the combination of realism
and utopia in its foundational myths only in the context of developments
in other fields of regulatory law where changing modes of norm-creation
have long been questioning dearly-held beliefs in public-private
distinctions of political, legitimate rule creation on the one hand and
private, market-based profit seeking on the other.72
The continuing, contested nature of international law illustrates particular
challenges to the law in post-conflict situations. There is no wellcontained, settled consensus on the scope and content of the international
law of occupation, nor is there a ready-to-wear, normative outfit worn by
the international law of post-conflict justice. Instead, the transnational
dimension in which these bodies of law interact, collide and fuse with
ongoing searches for better law and better norms of nation-building and
societal reconciliation in different parts of the world demonstrates the
degree to which a transnational law of post-conflict justice is undercutting,
accompanying and complementing the public international law of
occupation in distinct ways. As the nation-state alone ceases to provide the
context in which legal experiments unfold, norms are emerging in a deterritorialized sphere of world society. As narratives of post-conflict
situations and the role of law and alternative ordering mechanisms
continue to be developed and applied, we learn much about the

71

Luhmann, Law as a Social System (K.Ziegert transl., F.Kastner, D.Schiff, R.Nobles,
R.Ziegert eds.) (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2004), chapter 12.
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Zumbansen, "Sustaining Paradox Boundaries: Perspectives on the Internal Affairs in
Domestic and International Law" (2004a) 15 European Journal of International Law
[EJIL] 197-211.
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approximation of formerly isolated and distant regulatory experiments.73
The recognizance or execution of political will in the task of
reconstructing a state after a massive and encompassing change brings to
the fore every foundational myth that regularly appears in the context of
nation-building. But so much more is produced by that process, as the law
and politics of reconstruction collide with demands for societal
reconciliation and a future looking, reconstructive agenda based on
independent, self-governing terms. The law of post-conflict justice
collides head-on with the programs and ideologies of “law and
development.”74 This conflict between shock programs and carefully,
implemented, reconstructive and learning modes75 seems to characterize
the options available to international consultants and legal policy
programmers. Which model of the state, of the market, of society will
likely underlie and guide the reconstructive efforts that depend on the
financial and infrastructure support by the international community?
In seeking a tentative answer to this question, we are caught between
skepticsm and enthusiasm as to what conceptions of government,
governance, democracy, social welfare and private autonomy will likely
evolve from this inquiry. Realizing that path-dependent trajectories of
capitalist markets and social welfare regimes reflect - to a certain degree comparative institutional advantages, our perception can no longer remain
blind to the intricate causation chains between national reform politics and
impacts of globalized markets. In light of the often repeated complaint of
what globalization actually stands for and whether, for example,
globalization has caused immensive stress on welfare states or whether
structural changes within these states instead promoted and fueled certain
globalization phenomena, we ought to take seriously the growing
awareness within many international-oriented disciplines regarding the
73

See, for a powerful illustration, Swanee Hunt, This Was Not Our War. Bosnian Women
Reclaiming the Peace (Durham & London, Duke University Press, 2004), Chesterman,
You, The People, supra, 180-182.
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Posner, "Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development" (1998) 13 The
World Bank Research Observer 1-11, on the one hand, and Rittich, Recharacterizing
Restructuring. Law, Distribution and Gender in Market Reform (The Hague, Kluwer Law
International, 2002), on the other.
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limits and constraints of their traditional analytical instruments. While law
needs to embrace the sociological research that nourishes the phenomena
of legal pluralism, experimental law making and public-private
governance mixes76, we see a similiar eyeopening within the discipline
political science as it moves from a state oriented international relations
approach via focussing on international regimes towards increased
research of ever more flexible forms of governance. Likewise we see a
sudden awakening within historical research to the phenomena of
“transnationalism” which to us, however, can be no less than disturbing.
If, in law, we proceed onwards in the firm belief that for the purpose of
reassurance we can always turn back to law’s history, to its tracks of
development and even to its cross roads and turning points, it is quite
unsettling to have to realize that the historian herself will have had to first
develop her own adequate analytical approach before being able to firmly
guide us. We can recognize and should welcome this insecurity internal to
private and public international law, embracing it in the context of
questions that touch upon emerging forms of international governance that
are quite intricately related to changes within national legal orders. For the
participants on both ends of the debate, the transnationalist and the
traditionalist, there is no simple home to be found yet, no ready made bed
to lie in anymore. While the transnationalist will, sooner or later, be
confronted with a struggle for legitimacy mirrored so pointedly in the
history of our national legal and political orders, the traditionalist also can
no longer draw the blinds in order to resort to old ways. The nation state
and its legal order have undergone radical changes that prompt more
questions than are answers avalaible. Radical changes in public
administrative practice, the inescable and ever-recurring necessity of
speculative policy choices and the ensuing reflexive forms of law making
in a dense public-private mix, these features prompt closer inspection –
but they do not resemble the quiet home that some traditionalists want to
return to. From this follows that both perspectives, the transnational and
the traditional one, are valid and interdependent. In fact, in some sense, we
can either be both or none at all.
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See the masterful study by Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal
Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1988).
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VII. PAST AND FUTURE
“Ohne gemeinsame Begriffe gibt es keine Gesellschaft,
vor allem keine politische Handlungseinheit. ”77
“Aus den Horizonten normativer und formativer
Wertsetzungen kommen wir nicht heraus. ”78

At this point, it becomes very clear that any approach to ‘working through
the past’79 creates linkages between the past and the future. “We cannot
ask the historians, as Ranke did, to tell us ‘wie es wirklich gewesen ist’.
Instead, history is a reflection on the past from the present, and we must be
aware that the common identities that we forge and the narratives that we
live with emerge from processes of remembering and forgetting.”80
Indeed, the deciphering of the differently shaded heritages and legacies of
emerging polities – such as post-conflict, transitional societies as well as,
for example, the European Union – unveils the inseparability of an
assessment of the past from the design of the future.81 The law’s role in
this process of to and fro is crucial as it will aid in selecting, thereby
illuminating as well as silencing elements of the past, and even complete

77

Koselleck, Begriffsgeschichte und Sozialgeschichte, 108 (“Without common
terminology, there is not society, and above all no unity for political action”)
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J.Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis (Munich, Beck, 2nd ed., 1992) 129 (“We cannot
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terms with the past’. See, Theodor W. Adorno, “The Meaning of Working Through the
Past”, in Id., Critical Models (transl. Henry W. Pickford, New York, Columbia
University Press, 1998), 89.
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Shadow of its Pasts”, (2005) 6 German Law Journal, 245-254, at 250.
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pasts.82 And, here we apparently end back where we started. Law appears
as a salvaging force that can guide us out of the dark by its very appeal to
legitimacy. But, that the law has never been our own, is the tragic lesson
learned by the man waiting before the gates of the law as well as by all the
others that wait for law’s healing hand.83
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